Cybersecurity detection centers, extensive training recommended by NG911 working group
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Cybersecurity detection centers, extensive training recommended by NG911 working group
The group’s report does not provide specific physical locations for EC3’s, but it does recommend that those centers serve as local, regional and/or state systems that would complement network operations by “sharing in real-time across enterprise immediately,” threats to personally identifiable information, English said.
Running 24/7, these centers could cost public-safety entities in the neighborhood of $900,000 operationally, the working group revealed through an estimated cost-analysis that did not include physical construction expenses. Constructing these centers regionally would be a costs-savings for PSAPs, English said. English noted that 10 PSAPs could collaborate on an EC3 and each would contribute about $100,000 to the centers. The cost would vary based on staff size and population.
David Simpson, chief of the FCC public-safety and homeland-security bureau, applauded the cybersecurity working group’s efforts and noted that the approach—as far as strategic implementation and funding—would require an investment from elected officials, state chief information officers and other decision-makers outside of PSAPs.
English agreed and advised that it would take further work from the taskforce and other groups to flesh out the “foundational” plan proposed by the cybersecurity working group.
“In the cybersecurity world, we could come up with a report today that said these are the 101 steps you need to take to defend your enterprise, and tomorrow we’d have to change them all,” English said. “As we come up with methods to defend our enterprise, criminals and nation states are coming up with ways to thwart those methods almost as quickly as we can come up with ways to stop them.
“We believe we have delivered a foundational document. We hope this is something that public safety can use.”
One disturbing part of the
One disturbing part of the Cyber security puzzle is just which manufacturer do we trust for our NG911 network infrastructure and firewall equipment. Recent news of security concerns involving Huawei Technologies and the ZTE Corporation along with that of Juniper Networks firewall devices this week leaves one to question whether any company’s devices are 100% secure. Most companies leave a ‘backdoor’ in place to provision or diagnose problems involving their equipment. Are sufficient security measures in place within their own support departments to prevent current or disgruntled ex-employee’s from hacking into a system? Who exactly reviews the internal OS of this equipment and do they understand the internal coding hierarchy involved.
One measure of security that we will be using is a stand-alone Text to 911 system that doesn’t involve our NG-911 switch. The less ‘Doors and Windows’ you have the better off you are.